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Abstract and Keywords 
Studies that explain class voting have often focused on ‘bottom-up” social factors, but paid little 
attention to ‘top-down’ political factors. In this chapter, we argue that party positions on left-right 
ideology affect the strength of class voting. We test this thesis by estimating the impact of Left-Right 
party positions on the class-vote association through a Two-Step Hierarchical analysis of pooled 
data from Australia, the United States and 13 countries in Western-Europe (1960-2005) 
supplemented with data from the Comparative Manifesto Project. Although there is a general trend 
for class voting to decline over time, partially accounted for by the impact of education, we find that 
most variation in class voting does not take the form of a linear decline. The ideological positions of 
left-wing parties alone do not have any effect, but the polarization of parties along the left-right 
dimension is associated with substantially higher levels of class voting. 
Keywords:   social class, class voting, party manifestos, party positions, voting behaviour, electoral 
change, comparative analysis, western democracies 
Introduction 
In all democratic nations, including the United States, there has been a correlation between 
socioeconomic status and political beliefs and voting. The less privileged have supported parties 
that stood for greater equality and welfare protection, through government intervention, against the 
strain of a free enterprise economy.…This pattern has changed in recent decades (Lipset 1991: 
208). 
This statement by Seymour Martin Lipset paradigmatically encapsulates the central concern of class 
voting research. It not only identifies socio-economic inequality between groups as a driving force of 
political disagreement in societies, but also stresses interest in redistributionist policies as the 
rationale for the support of left-wing parties. Moreover, much of the scholarly debate on the politics 
of class has concerned the strength of the correlation between class and vote, and in particular the 
alleged decline or persistence of this association (cf. Evans 1999a; Knutsen 2007). Many scholars 
have deemed social class to be on the wane as a basis for voting behaviour (Clark and Lipset 1991; 
Franklin 1992; Nieuwbeerta 1995, Knutsen 2006) while a universal decline is rejected by others 
(Heath, Jowell, and Curtice 1987; Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995; Evans 1999a; Brooks, 
Nieuwbeerta, and Manza 2006; Elff 2007). What Lipset also makes clear however, and this has 
been less frequently observed, is that students of mass political behaviour should concentrate upon 
parties just as much as on voters. The structure of political supply is not (p.47) constant: policy 
positions of parties as well as the range of party positions within party systems vary across 
countries and over time. Such differences in political supply can affect voter decision-making by 
providing them with choices of varying relevance to their economic interests. 
This thesis has become known as the ‘top-down’ perspective on class voting (cf. Evans 2000), or 
more precisely, in this volume, the party choice thesis. From this perspective, patterns in class 
voting reflect the outcomes of party behaviour rather than ‘bottom-up’ influences resulting from the 
weakening of social structures. As Evans (2000: 411) points out, ‘the adoption of class-relevant 
policy programs should be associated with an increase in the class basis of partisanship’ and vice 
versa. Thus, variations in class voting are argued to derive from differences in the redistributive 
policy choices offered to voters. This raises a problem for comparative analyses of class voting—
whether over time or across countries—since the extent to which leftist parties advocate 
redistributionist policies and non-leftist parties oppose them is assumed to be fixed. Many 
comparative studies on class voting use a generic categorization of parties or party families (often 
‘left’ versus ‘non-left’) regardless of the fact that parties change their positions on policies or that 
different parties within the same ‘party family’ are perhaps similar but often far from equal (Knutsen 
1998; Mair and Mudde 1998; cf. Elff 2009). 
In the present chapter we address this concern by estimating the impact of the left-right positions of 
political parties on the association between class and vote through a broad comparative analysis of 
integrated data from fifteen countries in Western Europe, the United States and Australia between 
1960 and 2005. This approach contrasts with the single-country case studies that form the ensuing 
empirical chapters of the book in that it provides far more cases, with greater power to detect 
relationships than the other chapters, greater variation in the conditions under which the 
relationships are examined, and greater potential for generalized inferences. At the same time, this 
chapter illustrates the compromises involved in this increasingly influential mode of study; the 
diversity of national party systems is constrained and simplified to allow cross-national 
comparability, and only generally available independent variables are included in the analysis. 
Inevitably, the potentially complex conditional nature of changes in relationships between parties 
and their ostensible constituencies is not easily accommodated in pooled analysis. We return to 
consider the differences, if any, in the inferences to be drawn from the pooled cross-national and 
country case studies in the concluding chapter. 
For this analysis we construct a new large-scale dataset, the Comparative Dataset on Cleavage 
voting (CDCV), which provides the richest source of pooled individual-level surveys on the relations 
between class position and political choices available for Western countries in the post-war period. 
Left-right (p.48) positions of parties are estimated using data from the Comparative Manifesto 
Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). For information on the scales constructed from 
these datasets see Bakker and Hobolt’s chapter in this volume. In combination this evidence allows 
us to examine patterns of class voting across both countries and time, and to test the general claim 
that variations in parties’ left-right positions account for variations in the left-right, class-vote 
association. 
Two Approaches to the Decline of Class Voting 
Bottom-up 
For many scholars the salience of social classes has declined in contemporary Western societies 
and class in turn has lost its ability to explain political behaviour (Clark and Lipset 1991; Franklin 
1992; Nieuwbeerta 1995). Many of the explanations offered for this decline in class voting are driven 
by arguments about the weakening of social structures in increasingly individualistic post-industrial 
societies (for elaboration see Evans 1999a; Goldthorpe 1999). These explanations have taken 
various forms: rising living standards and the spread of affluence (Clark and Lipset 1991); the 
changing gender composition of class positions (Kitschelt 1994); the decline of traditional 
communities which has undermined class solidarity and led to more privatized, individualistic, and 
instrumental voters (Franklin 1985; Rose and McAllister 1986); growing intra- and intergenerational 
social mobility (Nieuwbeerta, De Graaf, and Ultee 2000), with upwardly mobile voters being more 
right-wing than those who remain in the working class, but also more left-wing than those in their 
destination class (De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta, and Heath 1995). Class conflict is also believed to be 
replaced by new social cleavages such as gender, ethnicity, and employment sector, or to have 
been cross-cut by new value cleavages (Knutsen 1988; Kitschelt 1994; Inglehart 1997; Van der 
Waal, Achterberg, and Houtman 2007). From this perspective the association between class and 
vote is declining because cultural (conservative) issues are increasingly relevant to party choice for 
the working class. Finally, it has been claimed that educational expansion, accompanied by a 
general increase of ‘cognitive mobilization’ has transformed voters from being driven by 
particularistic loyalties (such as social class) into calculative, preference- and issue-oriented citizens 
(Franklin 1985; Inglehart 1990), thus supposedly further weakening class divisions. 
In sum, the bottom-up approach to class voting claims that the decline of rigid, monolithic class 
structures accounts for declining levels of class voting. Classes have lost their distinctiveness as 
social mobility, (p.49) educational expansion, and compositional changes on the labour market have 
eroded the divisions between them, what we have termed in the introduction to this volume as the 
blurring of social boundaries and the increasing heterogeneity of social categories. This in turn 
diminishes the relevance of traditional class conflict for voters’ political choices, causing a decline in 
class voting. The gradualist nature of these social changes and, therefore, of the political changes 
they imply should produce a relatively steady decline in class politics. Any observed changes in 
class voting should take the form of a relatively smooth and monotonic decline, which should not 
include reversals (i.e. increases) in the strength of association. Hence we formulate hypothesis 1: 
H1 The association between class and vote for left- versus right-wing parties will have monotonically 
declined since the 1960s. 
To infer the causes of variations in class voting from the patterning of such change is not novel. 
Other studies of class voting (see Evans, Heath, and Payne 1991; Goldthorpe 1999; De Graaf, 
Heath, and Need 2001) have also relied on evidence concerning the volatility and abruptness of 
changes in the class-vote association to indicate the likelihood that changes in association can be 
seen as social or political in origin. We can go further, however, and include in our models some 
indicators of social change that have been thought to contribute to the weakening of class voting. 
The dramatic increase in participation in further and higher education, the spreading of this 
participation through the class structure (Breen and Jonsson 2005) and the growing impact of 
gender divisions (Inglehart and Norris 2003) on political choices can be expected to have weakened 
the effects of class position on party choice. We can therefore hypothesize that controlling for 
changes in the relationship between these social characteristics, social class, and party choice 
should reduce the observed pattern of changes in the class-party association. 
H2 The decline in the association between class and vote is (partly) explained by accounting for 
changes in the social characteristics of voters, such as education and gender. 
Party choice 
If the decline of social structure is assumed to be relatively gradualist and uni-directional, political 
change is by contrast considered to take a more discrete form, traceable to changes in party 
strategies and the emergence of new parties who shape the focus of political debates and interest 
representation. The degree to which parties offer choices that are more or less relevant to 
differences in interests between classes should condition the extent of class voting. From a party 
choice perspective, class voting is not only a consequence of the (p.50) strength of the class divide 
in societies, but is also conditioned by the extent to which political parties are seen to be associated 
with the interests of different social classes (Evans, Heath, and Payne 1999; Oskarson 2005; Elff 
2009). Insofar as class-relevant, economic issues rise in salience this may give rise to political 
polarization and reveal underlying differences between classes (Weakliem, 1993: 386). Similarly, as 
Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954: 147) argue, political campaigns revive old loyalties and 
re-engage differentiation between groups in society. In this respect the strength of class voting is 
conditioned by the extent to which political parties present themselves as representatives of 
working-class interests, and the extent to which they incorporate class-related issues in their 
political messages. By adopting a more middle-class orientated appeal left-wing parties weaken 
their support among the manual working class and increase it among the middle class. A similar 
argument is made by Przeworski and Sprague (1986) in their discussion of the ‘Dilemma of 
Electoral Socialism’. They argue that because manual workers are not the numerical majority in 
most societies, socialist parties aim to assure long-term survival by appealing to middle-class voters 
as well. This strategy undermines working-class political identity. 
The approach is not exclusively top-down because it assumes that party strategy itself is 
conditioned by structural changes; processes such as de-industrialization, market liberalization, and 
globalization transformed the highly industrialized economies of 1960s Western Europe into post-
industrial economies, where the new service and middle classes expanded and the manual class 
shrank (Esping-Andersen 1999a; Kitschelt 1994; Knutsen 2006). On average, the size of the labour 
force employed in industry fell by nearly 40 per cent between 1960 and 2005. Conversely, the share 
of the labour force employed in services gradually increased over the same period to an average of 
approximately 65 per cent (own calculations on the basis of CPDS data; Armingeon et al. 2008). 
Office-seeking left-wing parties can therefore be expected to place less emphasis on traditional 
working-class issues as the proportion of manual labourers in the population is smaller and its 
support carries less electoral benefit.1 
So far, however, the empirical validity of the top-down approach to class-based voting remains 
uncertain. Evans, Heath, and Payne (1991) and De Graaf, Heath, and Need (2001) present 
evidence of marked discontinuities between different elections that are consistent with party shifts 
rather than social (p.51) change, while Andersen and Heath (2003) suggest that political 
representation of social groups by parties enables social conflict to become politically relevant. They 
affirm that the impact of race in US elections is a reflection of firm Democratic standpoints on racial 
issues (Andersen and Heath, 2003: 322). Furthermore, Hill and Leighley (1996) argue that, at US 
state-level, the Democratic Party is better able to mobilize lower class voters if it is more liberal. 
However, all these studies infer top-down influence from the observation of discontinuity in the 
strength of class voting effects. They do not measure actual party positions. A few studies have 
done this, but as of yet they are inconclusive: Evans, Heath, and Payne (1999), Oskarson (2005) 
and Elff (2009) find evidence of party position effects, yet Weakliem and Heath (1999) find that class 
voting is not higher when voters perceive that ideological differences between parties exist. 
In this chapter we specify and test cross-nationally two operationalizations of the party choice 
thesis. The first concerns the absolute ideological position of left-wing parties. The further to the left 
these parties position themselves (e.g., by supporting typical class-related issues, maintaining 
strong ties to trade unions and calling for a strong welfare state to protect disadvantaged groups), 
the greater the salience of class in political decision-making. Evans, Heath, and Payne (1999: 88) 
find in their study of Britain between 1964 and 1997 that class voting diminishes when the Labour 
Party moves to the political centre. This implies that the effect of belonging to a particular social 
class on the probability of voting left-wing will be smaller. Therefore, we formulate the ‘left-wing 
party position hypothesis’: 
H3 The association between social class and vote for left- versus right-wing parties should be 
weaker when the left-right position of left-wing parties is more centrist. 
The second version of the top-down thesis concerns the relative positions of parties on the left-right 
ideological dimension. The emphasis here is on the distance between the main party choices that 
voters face, rather than the degree to which left-wing parties per se are ‘anchored’ in left-wing 
positions. Thus, the British Labour Party is not unique in its attempt to renew its social-democratic 
principles in an era of post-industrialization, market liberalization, and globalization (Kitschelt 1999). 
After 1989 most socialist parties no longer advocated the socialization of industry but strove instead 
for a more humane form of capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1999; Lipset 1991; Przeworski 1985). 
Keman and Pennings (2006) have shown that many Social Democratic parties in Western Europe 
moved to the centre of their party systems during the 1990s. They also argue that Christian 
Democratic parties likewise moved to the centre. Keman and Pennings argue that the convergence 
of traditional political parties creates the opportunity for new parties from both the left and (p.52) 
right to fill the void on the wings of party systems or to challenge the positions of established parties. 
Therefore the polarization of a party system, as an aggregate of all party positions, may affect class 
voting. If less advantaged classes support leftist parties because they favour redistributionist 
policies then the voting decision is dependent on the proximity between voter and party on socio-
economic issues. From a set of alternatives a voter will pick the party closest to his/her own political 
beliefs (Downs 1957b). Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960: 364) write that casting a 
class vote is more likely if voters ‘perceive that differences exist between parties that are relevant to 
class interest’ and Wessels and Schmitt (2008) have shown that the more polarized party systems 
are, the more relevant proximity is for voting. We expect that class differences in support for left-
wing parties are smaller when the left-right polarization of a party system is weaker. Hence we 
formulate the ‘party polarization hypothesis’: 
H4 The association between social class and vote for left- versus right-wing parties should be 
weaker in less polarized party systems. 
A final implication of the top-down approach is that changes in the ideological positions of parties 
can account for changing levels of class voting. Thus, if there has been a general pattern of 
movement to the centre by left-wing parties or a convergence in the left-right divisions between 
parties over time, this can explain changes over time in the class-vote relationship. By controlling for 
over-time changes in the ideological position of left-wing parties or the extent of ideological divisions 
between parties we should be able to statistically remove trends in class voting. We thus formulate 
our final hypothesis: 
H5 (a) movement to the ideological centre by left-wing parties or (b) the de-polarization of party 
systems should (partly) explain the decline in class voting. 
Data and Measurement 
Comparative Dataset of Class Politics 
We test our expectations using an integrated dataset of no fewer than 196 national surveys. Most of 
the surveys used were originally integrated into the International Social Mobility and Politics (ISMP) 
file (Nieuwbeerta and Ganzeboom 1996). The ISMP file contains individual information on social 
class and voting behaviour in sixteen democracies in Western Europe, North America, and Australia 
from 1956 to 1990. For our research we have updated the file by adding more detailed coding of 
some of the original country files and more (p.53) recent national surveys.2 In total, we use 105 out 
of the 113 surveys from the ISMP file. We exclude Canada and Ireland from the ISMP file because 
there is only a single survey available for Canada (CES 1984) and two for Ireland (ISSP 1989, 
1990), and we are unable to integrate additional surveys for these countries. We also substitute the 
Danish Election Surveys (1971, 1975, 1977, 1979, and 1981) in the ISMP file with more carefully 
recoded data on social class. Moreover, in addition to the ISMP file we include nine Spanish 
election surveys in our pooled dataset. In total we add ninety-six national surveys for fifteen 
countries. The newly constructed dataset, which we label the ‘Comparative Dataset on Cleavage 
Voting’, contains information on Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, (former 
West-) Germany,3 Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
and the United States between 1954 and 2008 (see Appendix A for the original data sources). The 
scope of the CDCV file, in terms of period and countries covered, is uniquely rich for data on the 
social bases of politics. But only certain variables were available in all surveys, and like many 
pooled datasets we face the familiar trade-off between the number of surveys integrated and the 
level of detail on respondents. 
To measure social class position we use a simplified version of the Erikson, Goldthorpe, and 
Portocarrero (1979), or EGP, class schema. We distinguish between four social classes: (1) the 
manual working class (collapsing the skilled and the unskilled workers), (2) the self-employed (petty 
bourgeois and farmers), (3) the routine non-manual class and, (4) the service class (lower and 
higher service class). Where possible the EGP class position is derived directly from the original file, 
either on the basis of an originally included EGP variable, or otherwise on the basis of an 
occupational code. In the latter case we converted ISCO-68 or ISCO-88 codes into EGP categories 
(Ganzeboom 2008). Some surveys contained class or occupational information on the basis of 
nation specific or heavily simplified coding schemes. In such cases we used national conversion 
tables to recode the national categories into the most appropriate EGP category. 
To measure voting behaviour we use different variables. In most surveys respondents were asked 
to name the party they voted for in the most recent election or voting intention for the upcoming 
election. When available, one (p.54) of these variables is opted for. In other, non-election, surveys, 
political party choice is measured as voting intention, i.e., ‘what would you vote if the election were 
today/next Sunday?’ or party identification. In order to allow for a cross-national and over-time 
comparison of voting behaviour we use a dichotomized measure of party choice. Therefore, we first 
standardized the respondent’s party choice by applying a fairly conventional party family 
categorization (primary source: Lane and Ersson 1999). Second, we dichotomized these party 
families on the basis of their traditional socio-economic appeal; distinguishing between left-wing 
parties (socialist, communist, left-socialist) coded as (0) and right-wing parties (liberal, conservative, 
agrarian, Christian democrats, and new/far right4) coded as (1). Voters who voted for another party 
are excluded from the analyses (e.g. green, regional parties, one-issue parties). 
Comparative Manifesto Data 
To determine the ideological position of the parties and party blocs we construct a scale using data 
from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). The CMP 
datasets are based on content analyses of election programmes of political parties contesting in 
national elections. The quantity and direction of statements by parties, measured in (‘quasi’) 
sentences in a programme, are classified into fifty-six policy categories over seven policy domains 
(namely external relations, freedom and democracy, political system, economy, welfare and quality 
of life, fabric of society, and social groups). Party positions in each country are matched to the 
individual-level data on the basis of the corresponding election year or the last preceding election. 
First, we construct a left-right party position based on economic and welfare policy issues. Because 
these two policy domains are about class-relevant issues like social inequality, redistribution, the 
protection of underprivileged groups, welfare state expansion, and economic principles, they are 
perhaps more closely associated with the traditional class conflict than the broad left-right scale by 
Laver and Budge (1992).5 We use three pre-constructed scales from the CMP data files: the 
planned economy scale is composed of the joint emphasis on the policy categories ‘market 
regulation: positive’, ‘economic (p.55) planning: positive’ and ‘controlled economy: positive’. The 
welfare scale consists of the policy categories ‘social justice: positive’ and ‘welfare state expansion: 
positive’. And the market economy scale is constituted by the policy categories ‘free enterprise: 
positive’ and ‘economic orthodoxy: positive’. We combine these three scales with three items on 
social groups, namely, ‘labour groups: positive’, ‘middle-class and professional groups: positive’ and 
‘labour groups: negative’. The first item measures ‘favourable references to labour groups, working 
class, unemployed; support for trade unions; good treatment of manual and other employees’, 
whereas the second item measures ‘favourable references to middle-class, professional groups, 
such as physicians or lawyers; old and new middle class’. ‘Labour groups: negative’ measures the 
‘abuse of power by trade unions’ and otherwise the reverse of ‘labour groups: positive’. We create a 
social-economic left-right position (hereafter L-R position) by combining the scales as (market 
economy + middle-class groups + negative labour groups)—(planned economy + welfare + labour 
groups).6 
We use this L-R scale to measure the left-right position of left-wing parties. Because our hypotheses 
are concerned with the position of left-wing parties as a group rather than as individual parties we 
construct a weighted mean of this scale for the left-wing party group in each country-year 
combination. The weight of a party within this group is determined by its vote share in percentages. 
Because the CMP data only includes so-called ‘significant’ parties (parties with coalition potential or 
the ability of political blackmail, see CMP coding instructions) not all parties in Western post-war 
electoral history are covered in the CMP dataset. Therefore, we are not able to include the position 
of minor left-wing parties in calculating the mean position of the left-wing party group. In order to 
measure party system polarization we employ a measure suggested by Dalton (2008b). Like other 
indicators of party polarization (e.g. Sigelman and Yough 1979) this index is calculated on the basis 
of the standard deviation from the average position of parties in a party system weighted by party 
size. (p.56)  
Pi=∑i=1N⎡⎣⎢⎢⎢⎢fi(xi−x&¯)5⎤⎦⎥⎥⎥⎥−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ⎷ 2 
Where, N is the number of parties in the party system, fi is the vote share of a specific party, xi is the 
L-R position of a party and x¯i is the average L-R position of all parties in the party system. The 
metric of this index runs from 0 (all parties occupy the same position) to 10 (full polarization along 
the ends of the L-R scale). 
Figure 3.1 shows the position of left-wing parties on the L-R scale, as well as the L-R party system 
polarization country by country from 1960 onwards. On the y-axis on the left-hand side, a higher 
score on the L-R scale means a more rightward (or centrist) position of left-wing parties. The second 
y-axis on the right-hand side portrays the degree of polarization of a party system based on the L-R 
scale. Whether or not the observed patterns in Figure 3.1 follow a linear course is tested in Table 
3.1. This table shows the correlations between election year and the L-R positions of left-wing 
parties for fifteen countries separately as well as the correlation between election year and the party 
system polarization. 
The patterns in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 tell us that there is no clear sign of a universal movement 
of left-wing parties since the 1960s and where such movement is observed it does not follow a 
linear trend in most cases (see also Achterberg’s (2006) analysis of the overall salience of class 
issues in elections using the CMP data between 1945 and 1948). The only clear signs of 
depolarization are observed in Australia, Belgium, and the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent in 
Sweden. In these countries there has been a rightward shift of left-wing parties since the 1960s; the 
L-R party system polarization decreased over this period has well. However, most discussions of 
depolarization refer to the period from around 1980 onwards. If we concentrate on that period, we 
see for Britain the clearest and perhaps most well-known example of a right-wing shift by a left party 
that precipitated ideological de-polarization. For this period, we also see convergence for Australia, 
Belgium (here the left party shifts left but right-wing parties shifted even further to the left), 
Netherlands, Sweden, and France. Finally, according to the CMP measures the USA likewise 
depolarizes in the second half of this period—though this is highly debatable (see Weakliem’s 
chapter in this volume). 
To test our hypotheses we select all surveys from the CDCV file in the period for which party 
manifesto data is available. This results in a selection of surveys between 1960–2003 (2004 for the 
US, 2005 for the UK). We include only those respondents with valid information on party choice, 
social class, age (in years), gender (female = 1) and education (recoded into years of education and 
standardized by country). Ultimately, our analyses are based (p.57)  
 Figure 3.1. L-R positions of left-wing parties and party polarization in fifteen countries between 
1960–2005. 
(p.58)  
Table 3.1. Linear trends (correlations with election year) in L-R positions of left-wing parties and L-R 
party polarization in fifteen countries (1960–2003a) 
Country N L-R position left-wing parties L-R party system polarization 
Australia 17 0.41* −0.51** 
Austria 13 −0.18 0.01 
Belgium 14 −0.33 −0.82*** 
Denmark 17 −0.28 −0.21 
Finland 12 0.19 −0.19 
France 11 0.31 0.20 
Germany 12 −0.23 0.42 
Italy 11 −0.06 0.26 
The Netherlands 13 0.62** −0.63*** 
Country N L-R position left-wing parties L-R party system polarization 
Norway 11 −0.10 −0.36 
Spain 8 −0.13 0.41 
Sweden 14 0.63** −0.43 
Switzerland 11 −0.12 0.38 
United Kingdom 11 0.202 −0.23 
United States 12 −0.16 −0.15 
Total 187 0.11 −0.22*** 
a 2004 for the US and 2005 for the UK. 
*p. 〈 0.1 
**p 〈 0.05 
***p 〈 0.01 
on 188 surveys from 15 countries with a total of 238,429 respondents. Because some surveys were 
held in the same year this comes down to 171 country-year combinations. Table 3.2 shows the 
period covered for each country, the number of included surveys, and the total number of 
respondents.  
Two-Step Hierarchical Estimation 
First-stage analyses 
Two-Step Hierarchical Estimation method (Achen, 2005) involves estimating a separate regression 
analysis for each survey (188) within our dataset. Given the categorical nature of our dependent 
variable we use binary logit models for these first-stage estimations. These models provide the 
multivariate effects of social class controlled for age, gender, and education on the probability of 
voting right versus left-wing. The class coefficients (with the manual class as the reference 
category) then become the variables to be explained at the second level. We use the natural 
logarithm7 of the odds ratios as the dependent variables in the second-stage analyses. The log-odds 
ratio is a relative measure of cleavage strength and has also been used in much previous research 
to study class voting. In the analysis at the second stage, we have to take into account that the 
estimated log-odds ratios from the first stage differ in reliability, due to differences in sample size or 
to differences in the extent of (p.59)  
Table 3.2. Surveys in the Comparative Dataset on class politics between 1960–2003* 
Country Period Number of surveys N of respondents % of total N 
Australia 1965–2001 14 21529 9.0 
Austria 1974–2003 7 3222 1.4 
Belgium 1975–2003 5 7355 3.1 
Denmark 1971–2001 13 18490 7.8 
Finland 1972–2003 6 3333 1.4 
France 1967–2002 7 14611 6.1 
Germany 1969–2002 22 25680 10.8 
Italy 1968–2001 8 9728 4.1 
The Netherlands 1970–2002 19 18226 7.6 
Norway 1965–2001 10 10974 4.6 
Country Period Number of surveys N of respondents % of total N 
Spain 1979–2000 7 14130 5.9 
Sweden 1972–2002 11 17792 7.5 
Switzerland 1971–2003 10 10600 4.4 
United Kingdom 1964–2005 17 27997 11.7 
United States 1960–2004 32 34762 14.6 
Total 1960–2005 188 238429 100.0 
*2004 for the US and 2005 for the UK 
class voting. Therefore, we use a case weight in the analysis which gives more weight to log-odds 
ratios with lower standard errors (Smits and Park 2009).  
We also estimated the effects of social class without controlling for age, gender, and education. 
Hypothesis 2 implies that differences in the association between class and vote over time are 
(partly) explained by changes in the composition of electorates. We therefore present an evaluation 
of both series of the first stage estimations. First, we present country by country graphs of the 
controlled log-odd estimates in Figures 3.2a (routine non-manual class), 3.2b (service class), and 
3.2c (self-employed) as well as the fitted trend lines. In order to visualize the degree of uncertainty 
surrounding the estimates we also present the corresponding standard error intervals. Second, 
because of the generally modest difference between the controlled and uncontrolled log-odds ratios 
we do not present the uncontrolled estimates in Figure 3.2, and thus we confine ourselves to the 
implied fitted trend lines. 
Let us first discuss the uncontrolled association between class and vote. Over all countries and 
years in our first stage models, the results confirm the expectation that the working class is 
generally less right-wing than other classes. As expected we find the largest differences in voting 
between the manual working class and the self-employed (mean log-odds ratio = 1.39), followed by 
the service class (mean log-odds ratio = 0.83). The smallest differences in voting in our models exist 
between the manual working class and the routine non-manual class (mean log-odds ratio = 0.56). 
In general we see the differences between classes decline in the period between 1960–70 and the 
2000s. For the routine non-manual class, the service class, and the self- (p.60)  
 Figure 3.2a. Estimated log-odds ratios for routine non-manual class to vote right-wing relative to 
manual working class (controlled for age, gender, education) in fifteen countries between 1960–
2005. 
(p.61)  
 Figure 3.2b. Estimated log-odds ratios for service class to vote right-wing relative to manual working 
class (controlled for age, gender, education) in fifteen countries between 1960–2005. 
(p.62)  
 Figure 3.2c. Estimated log-odds ratios for self-employed to vote right-wing relative to manual 
working class (controlled for age, gender, education) in fifteen countries between 1960–2005. 
(p.63) employed the odds of voting for a right-wing party, when compared with those for the manual 
working class, have decreased over the last four decades: class voting has converged over time. 
Despite this decline, the pattern of right-wing voting between classes for the most part persists: in 
2000–5 the self-employed are most different from the manual working class (mean log-odds ratio = 
1.13), followed by the service class (mean log-odds ratio = 0.34) and then the routine non-manual 
class (mean log-odds ratio = 0.19).  
With regard to cross-national differences, Figures 3.2a–3.2c reveal that class-based voting is 
strongest in Northern Europe (Denmark, Sweden, Finland) and the United Kingdom. In Norway 
relatively high log-odds ratios are also observed, yet Figure 3.2b also shows a clear decline in the 
differences between the service class and the manual working class in the period 1965–2001. The 
lowest levels of class voting are found in Italy, France, Switzerland, and the United States. In all 
countries the self-employed are most different from the working class and the routine non-manual 
class are most similar. In most countries the general pattern of declining class differences is also 
confirmed.8 The boundaries between the routine non-manual class and the working class seem to 
have declined only modestly in the majority of cases, but this is hardly surprising giving that these 
two classes were always fairly similar. In nearly all countries the decline of class voting is most 
apparent with respect to the comparison between the working class and service class. But the self-
employed are also, in almost all countries, decreasingly inclined to vote right-wing relative to the 
working class. The most notable exception to the general pattern is the United States. In the US 
differences in voting between working- class voters and the self-employed have increased. 
Let us now turn to the controlled log-odds estimates in Figures 3.2a–3.2c. Over all countries and 
years the controlled estimates are, as expected, somewhat weaker than the uncontrolled estimates, 
but the differences are rather small. Controlling for age, gender, and education only modestly 
explains the voting differences between the routine non-manual class and working class (mean log-
odds ratio decline = 0.04) and between the self-employed and working class (mean log-odds ratio 
decline = 0.03). Controlling for age, gender, and education has the largest effect on the political 
differences between the service class and the working class (mean log odds ratio decline = 0.14, 
which is on average about 20 per cent of the association). With respect to the service class, Figure 
3.2b shows that not only are the controlled log-odds ratios on average lower than the uncontrolled 
log-odds ratios, but also that in most countries the slopes of the fitted trend lines are weaker. 
Differences (p.64) between the controlled and uncontrolled fitted slopes for the routine non-manual 
class and the self-employed are less apparent. 
These findings give limited support to hypothesis 2: changes in the association between class and 
vote over time are in part explained by changes in the distribution and political impact of voters’ 
other social characteristics. The changing composition of the electorate is partly responsible for the 
decreasing political differences between the service class and the working class, but not for the 
differences between the working class and the routine non-manual class or self-employed. Most of 
this effect is accounted for by education. In general, older people are more often (mean b = 0.008) 
and females less often (mean b = −0.04) inclined to vote right-wing, but the effects of age and 
gender tend not to be significant. By contrast, we find that the more years of education a person has 
the more likely they are to vote right-wing (mean b = 0.19), though in most countries this association 
is weakening over time. 
Second stage Analyses 
At the second stage of the analysis each survey is used as one observation (N = 188), and we use 
the controlled log-odds ratios of differences between classes as dependent variables measuring the 
levels of class voting. Because we investigate three different class contrasts we have three 
dependent variables in the second stage. Because our observations are hierarchically clustered in 
countries––188 survey-observations nested in 15 countries—we undertake the analysis using 
multilevel modelling procedures. We use robust standard errors (sandwich estimators) in a 
multilevel linear regression and add case weights to control for the standard errors of the estimated 
log-odds ratios (cf. Smits and Park 2009). Descriptive statistics of the second-stage variables are 
presented in Table 3.3. 
We begin our second-stage tests by examining the correlations between the log-odds ratios 
measuring the strength of class voting on the one hand, and the independent variables resulting 
from our hypotheses on the other. Table 3.4 shows the zero-order correlation matrix of the second-
stage variables. Naturally, we observe positive correlations between the log-odds ratios  
Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics of second-stage variables 
 N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Log-odd routine non-manual classa 188 0.52 0.33 −1.45 1.40 
Log-odd service classa 188 0.69 0.46 −0.22 2.34 
Log-odd self-employeda 188 1.36 0.70 −0.01 3.66 
L-R position of left-wing parties 188 −20.51 8.41 −57.65 1.12 
L-R party system polarization 188 1.08 0.48 0.10 2.44 
Year of survey 188 1985 10.39 1960 2005 
a cases weight on the basis of their first-stage standard error estimation 
(p.65)  
Table 3.4. Correlation matrix of second-stage variables 
 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Log-odd routine non-manual class (N = 188) 0.692*** 0.309*** −0.100 0.294*** −0.241*** 
2. Log-odd service class (N = 188) − 0.544*** −0.227*** 0.363*** −0.330*** 
3. Log-odd self-employed (N = 188)  − −0.404*** 0.309*** −0.072 
4. L-R position of left-wing parties (N = 187)a   − −0.399*** 0.108 
5. L-R party system polarization (N = 187)a    − −0.215*** 
6. Year of survey     − 
a Correlation based on 187 observations in Comparative Manifesto Dataset (2001, 2006) for all 
election years between 1960 and 2005 for 15 countries. 
*p. 〈 0.1 
**p 〈 0.05 
***p 〈 0.01 
corresponding to different class contrasts. Most notably the log-odds ratios of the service class and 
self-employed have significant correlations with both manifesto-derived scales. Service class and 
self-employed voters less often vote right versus left-wing as left-wing parties become more right-
wing (r = −0.227 and r = −0.404) and more often vote right-wing as party system polarization 
increases (r = 0.363 and r = 0.309). The log-odds ratios of the routine non-manual class are not 
significantly correlated with the L-R position of left-wing parties, but there is a significant positive 
correlation (r = 0.294) with party system polarization: the larger the left/right polarization between 
parties, the more likely routine non-manual class voters will support a right-wing party instead of a 
left-wing party relative to the working class.  
The correlations between the log-odds ratios of class voting and a linear measure of year confirm 
our findings based on the plots in Figure 3.2. Year of survey is positively correlated with the log-
odds ratios of the routine non-manual class (r = 0.241) and the service class (r = 0.330), indicating 
declining differences in class voting over time. For the self-employed, the correlation between the 
log-odds ratios and year is not statistically significant. However, if we exclude all observations based 
on the US data and calculate the correlation based on the remaining 156 observation there is a 
significant and positive association (r = 0.280). This indicates what we have already noted in Figure 
3.2c. Contrary to the general decline of the political differences between the self-employed and the 
working class in most countries, these differences have increased in the US. 
Finally, Table 3.4 shows there is a negative correlation between the L-R position of left-wing parties 
and party system polarization (r = −0.399). In other words, as expected, a more right-wing position 
of left-wing parties is associated with low party system polarization. However, as was shown in 
Table 3.1, the L-R position of left-wing parties is not significantly correlated (p.66)  
Table 3.5. Second-stage parameter estimations of multilevel linear regression predicting the level of 
class voting measured in (controlled) log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party 
 
log-odds ratio to vote left versus 
rightmanual working class = 
reference group 
Routine non-
manual class 
Service class Self-employed and 
farmers 
Null Model b se b se b se 
Fixed Effects       
Intercept 0.476*** 0.0603 0.689*** 0.087 1.524*** 0.170 
Variance Components       
Level 1 variance 0.070*** 0.011 0.116*** 0.024 0.132*** 0.021 
Level 2 variance 0.045*** 0.017 0.095*** 0.026 0.390*** 0.121 
-2 Log likelihood 65.5 162.9 205.8 
Model I       
Fixed Effects       
Intercept 0.492*** 0.059 0.728*** 0.091 1.538*** 0.175 
Linear year * 10 (1985 = 0) −0.105*** 0.025 −0.199*** 0.035 −0.146** 0.057 
Variance Components       
Level 1 variance 0.060*** 0.008 0.076*** 0.012 0.109*** 0.017 
Level 2 variance 0.044*** 0.016 0.104*** 0.024 0.405*** 0.124 
-2 Log likelihood 36.1 90.4 172.9 
Model II       
Fixed Effects       
Intercept 0.499*** 0.057 0.737*** 0.089 1.555*** 0.170 
Linear year * 10 (1985 = 0) −0.114*** 0.025 −0.213*** 0.033 −0.189*** 0.041 
Variance Components       
Level 1 variance 0.058*** 0.007 0.068*** 0.012 0.087*** 0.011 
Level 2 variance 0.042*** 0.015 0.104*** 0.023 0.395*** 0.120 
Random slope linear year 0.002 0.002 0.007* 0.004 0.017** 0.009 
-2 Log likelihood 34.6 82.1 144.4 
Model III       
Fixed Effects       
Intercept 0.420*** 0.088 0.655*** 0.150 1.474*** 0.198 
Linear year * 10 (1985 = 0) −0.111*** 0.026 −0.209*** 0.034 −0.184*** 0.041 
L-R position of left-wing parties * 10 −0.036 0.033 −0.037 0.045 −0.037 0.026 
Variance Components       
Level 1 variance 0.057*** 0.007 0.068*** 0.012 0.086*** 0.010 
Level 2 variance 0.043*** 0.016 0.100*** 0.025 0.381*** 0.117 
Random slope linear year 0.002 0.002 0.007* 0.004 0.017** 0.009 
-2 Log likelihood 33.1 80.9 143.5 
Model IV       
Fixed Effects       
Intercept 0.387*** 0.072 0.602*** 0.084 1.408*** 0.167 
Linear year * 10 (1985 = 0) −0.109*** 0.025 −0.205*** 0.033 −0.183*** 0.040 
L-R party system polarization 0.104** 0.052 0.125*** 0.037 0.137** 0.055 
Variance Components       
Level 1 variance 0.056*** 0.007 0.066*** 0.011 0.084*** 0.011 
Level 2 variance 0.038*** −0.014 0.091*** 0.020 0.364*** 0.109 
Random slope linear year 0.002 −0.002 0.009* 0.005 0.017** 0.009 
-2 Log likelihood 29.0 75.4 138.2 
*p. 〈 0.1 
**p 〈 0.05 
***p 〈 0.01; Nsurveys = 188, Ncountries = 15 
(p.67) (p.68) with year. This suggests that there is no sign of a gradual, universal movement of left-
wing parties in the period 1960–2005. Party system polarization on the other hand is linearly 
associated with year (r = −0.22). This negative relationship suggests a pattern of gradual 
depolarization, though as we have seen in Figure 3.1, this is not the case in all countries.  
We continue our second-stage test by presenting the results of a series of multilevel linear 
regression analyses. Because we investigate three class contrasts we show the results of our 
models each time for three different log-odds ratios as the dependent variable. We start in Table 3.5 
by reporting a null model in order to show to what extent there is within-country and between-
country variation in the level of class voting. We find that for the routine non-manual class the null 
model indicates survey-level variance is 0.070 and the country-level variance is 0.045. The implied 
intra class correlation ((0.045/(0.045 + 0.070)) = 0.39) indicates that not only is there variation in the 
estimated log-odds between surveys but also considerable variation between countries. For the 
service class the intra class correlation is 0.45 and for the self-employed 0.75. 
We model trends in class voting by introducing a linear measure of year. Given that the plots of the 
first-stage estimated log-odds in Figure 3.2 showed that the decline of class voting is not a gradual 
process and that trends differ from country to country we tried to model these trends in various ways 
(i.e. ten-year categories, five-year categories, linear with a random intercept, linear with both 
random intercept and slope). Goodness-of-fit statistics and likelihood ratio tests (see Appendix B) 
show that including year of survey linearly with both a random intercept and slope in general proved 
to be the preferred model. Only with respect to the routine non-manual class is the random slope 
model rejected in favour of the random intercept model. In model I we therefore first present a 
random intercept model with the effect of year fixed over countries, and in model II we present a 
random coefficient model with a random slope of year for each country. In order to be able to 
interpret the mean intercept of the random coefficient model we centred the linear measure of year 
(1985 = 0). Both models I and II show negative year-effects on the log-odds ratios to vote right-wing. 
These estimates confirm that differences in voting between the working class and other classes 
have declined in recent decades. The most clear sign of decline is found with regard to the service 
class (mean slope = −0.213). The random slope variance is significant with respect to the service 
class and self-employed which confirms that the linear trends in class voting vary between 
countries. In Figure 3.3 we plotted the country-specific trends on the basis of Table 3.5, model II. 
This confirms that the association between class and vote for right- versus left-wing parties has 
declined since the 1960s in most countries, again with the self-employed in (p.69)  
 Figure 3.3. Predictions of country-specific trends in class voting(a) with a random intercept and slope 
of year. 
(a) measured in log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party (manual class = reference group) 
(p.70) the US as the most notable exception. The linear trends in Figure 3.3 show strong 
resemblance to the fitted trend lines in Figures 3.2a–c.  
We also estimated models I and II on the basis of the uncontrolled first-stage log-odds ratios (see 
Appendix B). By comparing the mean slopes of year with the (controlled) results in Table 3.5 we 
assess to what extent social changes account for the linear decline in class voting. With respect to 
the controlled and uncontrolled log-odds ratios of the self-employed the mean slope of linear year 
hardly differs. For the service class and the routine non-manual class however, the mean slope of 
year is 25 per cent and 35 per cent weaker, respectively, when regressing the controlled log-odds 
ratios instead of the uncontrolled log-odds ratios. These findings provide support for hypothesis 2, 
as the gradual decline of the association between class and vote is partly accounted for by the 
changing social characteristics of voters. 
In model III of Table 3.5, we include the L-R position of parties. Critics of the Comparative Manifesto 
Project argue that they are most appropriate for within-country comparisons but not necessarily for 
between-country comparisons (see Bakker and Hobolt, Chapter 2). In preliminary analyses we 
therefore included random slopes of the manifesto scales allowing these variables to have a 
different effect in each country. However, testing the variance of these slopes using likelihood ratio 
tests (see Appendix B) we found that allowing random slopes did not yield better model fits. We 
therefore rejected the random-coefficient models in favour of the random-intercept models and 
included the L-R positions of left-wing parties with a fixed slope over countries. We find that, 
allowing for country-specific trends, the positions of left-wing parties do not significantly affect the 
log-odds ratios for the routine non-manual class, the service class, or the self-employed. In other 
words, the likelihood of other classes voting right-wing relative to the working class does not 
decrease when left-wing parties are further to the ideological right. This finding refutes the left-wing 
party position hypothesis. 
In model IV we add party system polarization to our models. We see significant and positive effects 
of polarization on the log-odds ratios of voting right-wing. As the ideological polarization in a party 
system rises the first-stage estimated log-odds ratios for voting right-wing increase. This finding 
suggests that, allowing for country-specific trends, the routine non-manual class (0.104), the service 
class (0.125), and the self-employed (0.137) are more inclined to vote right-wing as the ideological 
differences between political parties increase. Thus the association between social class and vote 
declines as the party system polarization decreases. Therefore the polarization hypothesis is 
supported.9 The latter is evidenced in Figure 3.4 by the plotted effect of L-R (p.71)  
 
Figure 3.4. Plotted effect of party polarization on the log-odds ratio to vote right-wing relative to the 
working class (year is fixed at 1985). 
party system polarization on the basis of model IV. However, the negative year-effects on the log-
odds ratios to vote right-wing are not substantially reduced by including party system polarization. In 
both model III and IV we observe negative year-effects on the log-odds ratios to vote right-wing. 
Therefore the ‘political change hypothesis (5)’ is not confirmed: neither shifts to the centre by left 
party families, nor party system polarization, account for the over-time decline of left-right class 
voting.  
Conclusion 
Social class has undeniably weakened as a basis of left-right party choice. We not only observe 
smaller class differences over time in the majority of the countries in this study, we also find a 
general pattern of converging class differences in the pooled analyses. The differences between the 
service class and the working class have lost much of their strength. The difference between the 
self-employed and the working class is also, in general, weakening. The most apparent exception to 
the general pattern is the United States, where differences in voting between the working class and 
the self-employed are increasing rather than decreasing. 
Although our results are consistent with the erosion of class voting in modern democracies, they do 
not signal the end of class politics. Class (p.72) continues to have an impact on party choice in most 
countries and, despite the decline of the magnitude of differences, the order in which classes favour 
left or right parties for the most part endures: across the forty-five-year period the self-employed are 
the most different from the manual working class, followed by the service class and the routine non-
manual class. Moreover, although there seems to be a general pattern of decline, the plotted 
country figures show that the process is not gradual in nature for many of the countries we 
examined. The large majority of the variation in the strength of class voting is not associated with 
linear decline. 
We also attempted to explain variation in the association between class and vote by accounting for 
changes in the social structure and ideological distances between parties. Our results partly support 
the idea that compositional changes lead to changes in class voting; changes in background 
characteristics (age, gender, and education) are partly responsible for the decline in political 
divisions between classes—approximately one fifth of the linear decline is accounted for by these 
variables. This is primarily due to changes in the relationship between education and class position. 
As educational level is generally rising in post-industrial societies this development offers a bottom-
up explanation for changes in levels of class voting—particularly those between the service class 
and the working class. 
As well as examining structural bottom-up explanations for the levels of class voting we also tested 
two versions of the political choice thesis. We did not find evidence for the idea that left-right 
positions of left-wing parties alone influence the association between class and vote. We do find, 
however, that when ideological differences between political parties are smaller the association 
between class and vote is weaker. This indicates that the extent of class-related political choices 
presented to voters can influence the extent to which they vote along class lines. This is evidence 
consistent with the impact of political choice; a top-down source of influence. Importantly, however, 
only the extent of left-right party system polarization appears to matter. This suggests this top-down 
effect relates to calculations about the differences between parties presented to voters, rather than 
voter proximity to left parties per se. 
What this pattern of top-down influence fails to do, however, is explain the time trend in class voting. 
This failure is evident in the rather weak correlation (0.22) between party ideological convergence 
and time itself. In some countries left parties have moved to the centre over time and/or there has 
been ideological convergence, but in others these patterns have been reversed. In some countries 
we might expect to find party ideological convergence accounting for a decline in class voting (as in 
Evans, Heath, and Payne 1999) but we should not expect to find this at the more general level 
examined in this chapter. 
(p.73) Clearly this analysis represents an early stage of systematic research into the impact of 
political choice on cleavage strength, the presence of which has previously usually been inferred 
from narrative accounts of party strategies (i.e. Mair et al. 2004), so the limitations of this broad 
cross-national study need to be kept in mind. There is undoubtedly measurement error in the CMP 
data and because of the need for cross-national comparability our measures are of the left-right 
position of party family groups rather than individual parties. Class, too, has been measured quite 
crudely without differentiating between higher and lower professional and managerial positions. As 
we shall see in the ensuing chapters, within-country comparisons in single country studies allow 
more detailed measures of party positions and patterns of change. They also permit us to use 
greater precision in operationalizing evidence of the blurring of social boundaries, evidence of the 
compositional changes that have supposedly weakened the distinctiveness of social classes, and 
measurement of the classes themselves. 
The limitations of the cross-national approach to understanding these complex issues will be most 
readily observed when comparisons are made in the individual country chapters that follow. In the 
British case, for example, our categorization of party choice results in merging the Liberal 
Democrats with the Conservatives instead of Labour. With this recoding we are unable to detect the 
collapse of class voting in the 1997 elections that is documented by Evans and Tilley in the chapter 
examining the British case. Similarly, in Denmark, we find a different pattern of class voting over 
time than is revealed in the more detailed analysis presented in Hobolt’s chapter. Moreover, our 
pooled data do not permit the inclusion of other individual level social characteristics, which may 
well play a significant role in explaining declining levels of class voting. Given the emphasis on the 
redistribution of resources as a rationale for voting left-wing, for example, an individual?s ideological 
orientations along the economic left-right dimension may be one such factor, as is indicated in 
several of the country chapters that follow. 
It would seem unlikely that these limitations will fatally undermine the finding that party system 
polarization impacts on class voting, however. Moreover, the range of outcomes observed in 
different countries testifies to the fundamental diversity of change over time in, for example, patterns 
of political convergence, which are all too often assumed to be general in form with only a few 
exceptional cases (i.e. the USA, as we have seen here). This chapter and mode of analysis is likely 
to provide an important step towards expanding the examination of cleavage change beyond 
bottom-up processes in the direction of those involving the relevance of the choices that parties 
provide for voters. How its broad claims fare in comparison with the findings of more detailed 
studies will be revealed in the chapters that follow. 
(p.74) Appendix A: Data Sources 
Data Archives: 
 ASSDA 
Australian Social Science Data Archive, Canberra, Australia 
 CDSP 
Centre de Données Socio-Politiques C for Socio-Political Data, Paris, France 
 CSES 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Ann Arbor (MI), USA 
 CIS 
Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas Institute for Sociological Studies, Madrid, Spain 
 DANS 
Data Archiving and Networked Services, The Hague, the Netherlands 
 DDA 
Danish Data Archive, Odense, Denmark 
 ESRC 
ESRC Data Archive, Essex, United Kingdom 
 ITANES 
Italian National Election Survey, Istituto Carlo Cattaneo, Bologna, Italy 
 ICPSR 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor (MI), USA 
 ISMP 
International Social Mobility and Politics File (DANS: P1145) 
 NSD 
Norwegian Social Science Data Service, Bergen, Norway 
 SIDOS 
Swiss Information and Data Archive Service for the Social Sciences, Neuchâtel, Switzerland 
 SSD 
Swedish Social Science Data Service, Göteborg, Sweden 
 ZA 
Zentral Archive, Cologne, Germany 
Data files by country 
Australia 
File reference # 
AUS65 DANS P1145 
AUS67 DANS P1145 
AUS73 DANS P1145 
AUS79 DANS P1145 
AUS84 DANS P1145 
AUS85I DANS P1145 
AUS86I DANS P1145 
AUS87 DANS P1145 
AUS87I DANS P1145 
AUS90E DANS P1145 
AUS93E ASSDA 0763 
AUS96E ASSDA 0943 
AUS98E ASSDA 1001 
AUS01E ASSDA 1048 
(p.75)  
Austria 
File reference # 
AUT74P DANS P1145 
AUT85I DANS P1145 
AUT88I DANS P1145 
AUT89I DANS P1145 
AUS95I ZA 2280 
AUS99I ZA 3430 
AUS03I ZA 3910 
Belgium 
File reference # 
BEL75 DANS P1145 
BEL91 DANS P1228 
BEL95 DANS P1422 
BEL99 CSES 1 
BEL03 CSES 2 
Denmark 
File reference # 
DEN71E DDA 0658 
DEN72S DDA 0658 
DEN75E DDA 0658 
DEN77E DDA 0658 
DEN79E DDA 0658 
DEN81E DDA 0658 
DEN84E DDA 0772 
DEN87E DDA 1340 
DEN88E DDA 1432 
DEN90E DDA 1564 
DEN94E DDA 2210 
DEN98E DDA 4189 
DEN01E DDA 12516 
Finland 
(p.76)  
File reference # 
FIN72S DANS P1145 
FIN75P DANS P1145 
FIN91E FSD 1018 
FIN95E FSD 1031 
FIN99E FSD 1042 
FIN03E FSD 1260 
France 
File reference # 
FRA67E ICPSR 2978 
FRA68E ICPSR 7274 
FRA78E DANS P1145 
FRA88E CDSP PE1988 
FRA95E CDSP PEl1995 
FRA97E CDSP PE1997 
FRA02E CDSP PEFV 
Germany 
File reference # 
GER69E DANS P1145 
GER69F DANS P1145 
GER75P DANS P1145 
GER76Z DANS P1145 
GER77Z DANS P1145 
GER78C DANS P1145 
GER78X DANS P1145 
GER79Z DANS P1145 
GER79X DANS P1145 
GER80A DANS P1145 
GER80C DANS P1145 
GER80P DANS P1145 
GER80Z DANS P1145 
GER82A DANS P1145 
GER84A DANS P1145 
GER86A DANS P1145 
GER87I DANS P1145 
GER88A DANS P1145 
GER90A DANS P1145 
GER94E ZA 3911 
GER98E ZA 3911 
GER02E CSES 3 
Italy 
(p.77)  
File reference # 
ITA68E ICPSR 7953 
ITA75P ICPSR 7777 
ITA85 NYM ITA85 
ITA90E ITANES 1990 
ITA92E ITANES 1992 
ITA94E ITANES 1994 
ITA96E ITANES 1996 
ITA01E ITANES 2001 
Netherlands 
File reference # 
NET70 DANS P1145 
NET71 DANS P1145 
NET72E DANS P1145 
NET74P DANS P1145 
NET76 DANS P1145 
NET77E DANS P1145 
NET77L DANS P1145 
NET79P DANS P1145 
NET81E DANS P1145 
NET82E DANS P1145 
NET85S DANS P1145 
NET86E DANS P1145 
NET87 DANS P1145 
NET89M DANS P1145 
NET89E DANS P1000 
NET90S DANS P1145 
NET94E DANS P1208 
NET98E DANS P1415 
NET02E DANS P1628 
Norway 
File reference # 
NOR65E DANS P1145 
NOR72S DANS P1145 
NOR77E DANS P1145 
NOR81E DANS P1145 
NOR85E DANS P1145 
NOR89E DANS P1145 
NOR90I DANS P1145 
NOR93E ZA 3911 
NOR97E ZA 3911 
NOR01E CSES 2 
Spain 
(p.78)  
File reference # 
SPA79E CIS 1192 
SPA82E CIS 1327 
SPA86E CIS 1542 
SPA89E CIS 1842 
SPA93E CIS 2061 
SPA96E CIS 2210 
SPA00E CIS 2384 
Sweden 
File reference # 
SWE72S DANS P1145 
SWE76E ZA 3911 
SWE79E ZA 3911 
SWE82E ZA 3911 
SWE85E ZA 3911 
SWE88E ZA 3911 
SWE91 DANS P1145 
SWE91E ZA 3911 
SWE94E ZA 3911 
SWE98E ZA 3911 
SWE02E SSD 0812 
Switzerland 
File reference # 
SWI71E SIDOS 8862 
SWI72 DANS P1145 
SWI75E SIDOS 8862 
SWI76P DANS P1145 
SWI79E SIDOS 8862 
SWI87E SIDOS 8862 
SWI91E SIDOS 8862 
SWI95E SIDOS 8862 
SWI99E SIDOS 8862 
SWI03E SIDOS 8862 
United Kingdom 
File reference # 
ENG64E DANS P1145 
ENG66E DANS P1145 
ENG70E DANS P1145 
ENG74O DANS P1145 
ENG79E DANS P1145 
ENG83E DANS P1145 
ENG85I DANS P1145 
ENG86I DANS P1145 
ENG87E DANS P1145 
ENG87I DANS P1145 
ENG88I DANS P1145 
ENG89I DANS P1145 
ENG90I DANS P1145 
ENG92E ZA 3911 
ENG97E ZA 3911 
ENG01E ZA 3911 
ENG05E ESRC 2005 
(p.79) United States 
USA60E DANS P1145 
USA64E DANS P1145 
USA66E DANS P1145 
USA68E DANS P1145 
USA70E DANS P1145 
USA72E DANS P1145 
USA72G DANS P1145 
USA73G DANS P1145 
USA74G DANS P1145 
USA74P DANS P1145 
USA75G DANS P1145 
USA76E ANES 48–04 
USA76G DANS P1145 
USA77G DANS P1145 
USA78G DANS P1145 
USA80E ANES 48–04 
USA80G DANS P1145 
USA82G DANS P1145 
USA83G DANS P1145 
USA84E ANES 48–04 
USA84G DANS P1145 
USA85G DANS P1145 
USA86G DANS P1145 
USA87G DANS P1145 
USA88E ANES 48–04 
USA88G DANS P1145 
USA89G DANS P1145 
USA90G DANS P1145 
USA92E ANES 48–04 
USA96E ANES 48–04 
US00AE ANES 48–04 
US04AE ANES 48–04 
(p.80) Appendix B: Model selection and additional analyses 
Table B3.1. Goodness-of-fit statistics of multilevel linear regression models of class voting1 on year 
Model df Log Likelihood AIC BIC 
Routine non-manual class     
Null model 3 −32.77 71.54 81.25 
Random intercept (10-year intervals) 7 −16.52 47.04 69.69 
Random intercept (5-year intervals) 11 −11.86 45.72 81.32 
Random intercept (linear year) 4 −18.04 44.08 57.02 
Random slope (linear year) 6 −17.31 46.62 66.04 
Service class     
Model df Log Likelihood AIC BIC 
Null model 3 −81.44 168.88 178.58 
Random intercept (10-year intervals) 7 −45.88 105.77 128.42 
Random intercept (5-year intervals) 11 −43.43 108.86 144.46 
Random intercept (linear year) 4 −45.19 98.38 111.32 
Random slope (linear year) 6 -41.06 94.12 113.54 
Self-employed     
Null model 3 −102.89 211.77 221.48 
Random intercept (10-year intervals) 7 −87.07 188.13 210.79 
Random intercept (5-year intervals) 11 −83.77 189.53 225.13 
Random intercept (linear year) 4 −86.44 180.89 193.83 
Random slope (linear year) 6 −72.19 156.38 175.80 
1 measured in log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party (manual class = reference group) 
Table B3.2. Likelihood-ratio test of multilevel linear regression models of class voting1 on linear year 
Model LRχ² (df) Compared to P-value 
Routine non-manual class    
Random intercept (linear year) 29.46 (1) Null model 0.0000*** 
Random slope (linear year) 1.46 (2) Random intercept 0.4819 n.s. 
Service class    
Random intercept (linear year) 72.50 (1) Null model 0.0000*** 
Random slope (linear year) 8.26 (2) Random intercept 0.0161** 
Self-employed    
Random intercept (linear year) 32.88 (1) Null model 0.0000*** 
Random slope (linear year) 28.51 (2) Random intercept 0.0000*** 
*p 〈 0.1 
**p 〈 0.05 
***p 〈 0.01 
1 measured in log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party (manual class = reference group) 
(p.81)  
Table B3.3. Likelihood-ratio test of multilevel linear regression models of class voting1 on L-R 
position of left-wing parties/L-R party system polarization 
Model LRχ² (df) Compared to P-value 
Routine non-manual class     
Random intercept (L-R position of left-wing parties) 3.76 (1) Null model 0.0659 * 
Random slope (L-R position of left-wing parties) 1.72 (2) Random intercept 0.4238 n.s. 
Random intercept (L-R party system polarization) 8.08 (1) Null model 0.0045 *** 
Random slope (L-R party system polarization) 2.23 (2) Random intercept 0.3271 n.s. 
Service class     
Random intercept (L-R position of left-wing parties) 6.25 (1) Null model 0.0124 ** 
Model LRχ² (df) Compared to P-value 
Random slope (L-R position of left-wing parties) 0.23 (2) Random intercept 0.8927 n.s. 
Random intercept (L-R party system polarization) 10.53 (1) Null model 0.0012 *** 
Random slope (L-R party system polarization) 3.57 (2) Random intercept 0.1679 n.s. 
Self-employed     
Random intercept (L-R position of left-wing parties) 47.51 (1) Null model 0.0000 *** 
Random slope (L-R position of left-wing parties) 0.39 (2) Random intercept 0.8227 n.s. 
Random intercept (L-R party system polarization) 48.96 (1) Null model 0.0000 *** 
Random slope (L-R party system polarization) 1.55 (2) Random intercept 0.4616 n.s. 
*p 〈 0.1 
**p 〈 0.05 
***p 〈 0.01 
1 measured in log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party (manual class = reference group) 
(p.82)  
Table B3.4. Second-stage parameter estimations of multilevel linear regression predicting the level 
of class voting measured in uncontrolled log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party 
log-odds ratio to vote left versus 
right manual working class = 
reference group 
Routine non-
manual class 
Service class Self-employed and 
farmers 
Null Model b  se b  se b  se 
Fixed Effects          
Intercept 0.534***  0.071 0.851***  0.109 1.548***  0.165 
Variance Components          
Level 1 variance 0.079***  0.014 0.167***  0.037 0.131***  0.021 
Level 2 variance 0.062***  0.020 0.151***  0.052 0.364***  0.114 
-2 Log likelihood 89.9 232.6 202.5 
Model I          
Fixed Effects          
Intercept 0.559***  0.072 0.903***  0.116 1.562***  0.170 
Linear year * 10 (1985 = 0) −0.155***  0.032 −0.266***  0.045 −0.152***  0.053 
Variance Components          
Level 1 variance 0.055***  0.007 0.096***  0.018 0.105***  0.018 
Level 2 variance 0.065***  0.019 0.172***  0.052 0.381***  0.116 
-2 Log likelihood 28.9 138.5 165.9 
Model II          
Fixed Effects          
Intercept 0.574***  0.068 0.915***  0.113 1.579***  0.165 
Linear year * 10 (1985 = 0) −0.174***  0.029 −0.285***  0.044 −0.192***  0.039 
Variance Components          
Level 1 variance 0.049***  0.005 0.079***  0.016 0.086***  0.012 
Level 2 variance 0.060***  0.018 0.169***  0.051 0.370***  0.111 
log-odds ratio to vote left versus 
right manual working class = 
reference group 
Routine non-
manual class 
Service class Self-employed and 
farmers 
Random slope linear year 0.006**  0.004 0.018*  0.009 0.015*  0.008 
-2 Log likelihood 19.6 120.9 142.2 
Notes: 
(1) Though socio-demographic change alone is not sufficient to explain party behaviour: as Kitschelt 
(1999: 344) points out, party strategy depends on political-economic conditions, and the competitive 
setting of elections, as well as party organizational features. For Kitschelt (1994: 41) it is ‘naïve’ to 
treat left-wing electoral support as a direct function of the proportion of blue collar workers in the 
labour force. 
(2) We are most grateful to Gary Marks for assisting us in collecting and coding the Australian 
Election Surveys 1993–2004, to David Weakliem for providing us with coded files of the American 
National Election Studies 1954–2004, to Lluís Orriols for providing and recoding the Spanish 
Election Studies 1979–2008, to Sara Binzer-Hobolt for providing the Danish Election Surveys, and 
to Florent Gougou for assisting us in collecting and coding French survey data for 1958, 1967, 1968, 
1995, and 2007. 
(3) Because the German surveys in the ISMP file (all prior to 1990) only concern the Federal 
Republic of Germany (BRD) we excluded, for comparability reasons, all respondents from the 
former German Democratic Republic (DDR) in the post 1990 surveys. 
(4) We thus treat far right parties as right-wing, despite their appeal to the working class. Excluding 
far right parties from the analyses does not substantially change the results. On average the 
estimated class-coefficients at the first stage are somewhat higher, and the trends modelled at the 
second stage are somewhat less steep. But there are no substantial changes in the effect of L-R 
positions of left-wing parties or in the effect of party system polarization. 
(5) We also examined the left-right scale provided by Laver and Budge (1992) which we coded to 
range from completely left (-100) to completely right (+100). Because this scale is a combination of 
twenty-six policy categories (thirteen left + thirteen right) related to all seven policy domains in the 
CMP data it is a measure of the overall left-right party position. We found however that the 
economic left-right scale based on more specific class-relevant policy issues is more strongly 
associated with levels of class voting. 
(6) In addition to the traditional socio-economic left-right dimension we consider the relevance of a 
‘new’ second dimension in politics. We tried to construct a scale for progressive versus conservative 
policy positions, by adopting a scale construction procedure employed by Keman and Pennings 
(2006). The Bakker-Hobolt new-politics scale used in other country chapters in most countries 
correlates 0.60 to 0.75 with this scale, but is not available for all fifteen countries in this chapter. 
Pennings and Keman use the five policy categories in the CMP data to measure the emphasis on 
progressive issues, and five categories to measure conservative issues. The progressive issues 
are: anti-growth economy, national way of life: negative (i.e. appeals to patriotism/nationalism), 
multiculturalism: positive, traditional morality: negative (i.e. opposition to traditional moral values), 
and environmentalism: positive. The conservative issues are: social harmony (e.g. need for society 
to see itself as united), national way of life: positive, multiculturalism: negative, traditional morality: 
positive, and middle class groups: positive. Checks of country-specific patterns lead us to doubt the 
validity of this scale. Moreover, we find that party system polarization based on this second 
dimension scale has no significant effect (p 〉 0.1) on class voting. Hence we have insufficient 
confidence in this scale to include it in the analyses presented here. 
(7) It has the advantage of being asymptotically normally distributed (Agresti 2002). 
(8) With regard to the extent to which the trend lines fit the estimated points country by country 
(Achen 2005: 455) we emphasize the relatively poor fit of the trend lines for Switzerland in Figure 
3.2a and Finland in Figure 3.2b. 
(9) We employed two robustness checks. First, we repeated the analyses, each time excluding one 
of the countries. In the case of all three dependent variables, excluding specific countries did not 
produce substantively different results with respect to the parameter estimates for party polarization. 
In all cases a higher level of party system polarization is associated with higher log-odds ratios for 
class voting. Second, we replaced party system polarization with the ‘ideological range in a party 
system’ (measured as the distance on the L-R scale between the most right-wing party and the 
most left-wing party in a party system. Again, no substantive differences were found. 
 
